Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT) Challenge Fund
Final Report

To be completed with reference to the "Writing a Darwin Report" guidance:
(http://www.darwininitiative.org.uk/resources-for-projects/reporting-forms). It is expected that this report will be a **maximum** of 20 pages in length, excluding annexes.

IWT Challenge Fund Project Information

Project reference	IWT 018
Project title	Developing long-term law enforcement capacity to protect the Mali elephants
Country(ies)	Mali, Burkina Faso
Contract holder institution	The WILD Foundation
Partner institution(s)	The Mali Government: Ministry of the Environment - La Direction Nationale des Eaux et Forets (DNEF). The US Embassy to Mali.
Total IWT grant value	£300,000
Start/end dates of project	1st February 2015 – 31st March 2018
Project leader's name	Dr Susan Canney
Project website/blog/social media	http://www.wild.org/mali-elephants/
Report author(s) and date	Dr Susan Canney, 27th June 2018

NB ALL INFORMATION IN RED IS SENSITIVE AND IS NOT TO BE POSTED ONLINE TO PROTECT THE LOCAL FIELD TEAM AND ECOGUARDIANS

1.   Project Summary

The migratory desert elephants of central Mali (see map in annexe 1) are under severe threat from networks of international traffickers working together with local accomplices. During the conflict of 2012-2013 the elephant range was under the control of armed groups and experienced its first incidences of poaching, and post-conflict residual insecurity presents an ongoing danger.

For the first 3 years, the project was able to contain the poaching t███████████████████ ███████████████ however the ongoing insecurity required a government anti-poacher ranger force ██.

Unfortunately Mali has very few foresters, training standards are poor, capacity to deal with elephant poaching is non-existent, ███████████████████████████████████ ████████████ There are few agents covering hundreds of square kilometres, living at home with no means of displacement. This is compounded by low morale and lack of belief in the value of their work, an antagonistic relationship with local communities, and a complete lack of synergy with other agents, fuelling the isolation that makes them susceptible to corruption.

This initiative aims to develop effective anti-poaching operations at field level by building on existing tried and tested approaches to create an integrated ████████ ████████████ anti-poaching operation. IWTC funds provide this linkage through the provision of communications, transport, and training for the ranger force; ██████████████████ ██████████████████████████████████████ ██████████████████████████████████████ ███████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ █████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ █████████████████████████████████ ██████████████████████████████████ ███████████████████████████████ █████████████████

██ ██████████████████████████ In addition to the improved security in the strategically important central region of the country, Mali will benefit through increased capacity to assure the security of its unique herd of elephants, a source of national pride, and a greater ability to protect and regenerate its biodiversity and natural resources. The international community benefits from the protection of 12% (pre-conflict) of the West African elephant population, and one of only two populations of desert-adapted elephants that instils wonder at its ability to survive.

2.   Project Partnerships

The WILD Foundation cemented its relationship with the Malian Government by obtaining its "Accord Cadre" in April 2015, giving it official status as an international NGO. This is a demanding and lengthy process that takes a minimum of 3-4 years, requiring extensive evidence of effective operation in-country and is an endorsement of project-government relations.

The project's modus operandi is to achieve its goals through working closely with local institutions. A good example is the community meetings described below and the letter their representatives delivered to the Prime Minister in person in annexe.

The project has always worked closely with the Ministry of the Environment (MEADD) and its agency responsible for conservation, the Direction Nationale des Eaux et Forets (DNEF). Although capacity and morale is generally very low, the project has always identified and supported competent and engaged individuals with the aim of increasing DNEF's capacity. Working with a volatile government with frequent changes of personnel is challenging but the project has developed allies over the years who enable progress to be made, albeit sometimes much more slowly than at other times.

At the launch of the IWT funding, there was a change in leadership at the head of the Direction National des Eaux et Forets (DNEF) which posed significant challenges, however relationships with the Ministry of Defence and the Malian military have increased and resulted in a very fruitful collaboration, with the Prime Minister instructing the Minister of Defence to include elephant protection in their consideration and planning.

It now works also with the Malian army, and the Ministries of Defence, of Internal Security and of Territorial Administration, and a Presidential directive (annexe 2) in response to a red alert issued by the project in annexe 3) has instructed the Cabinet of Ministers that all relevant government bodies and institutions to work together to conserve Mali's elephants. The project also works with the Parliamentary Committee on Wildlife who raise issues in Parliament and act as a "watch-dog".

The MEP and its partners have developed a multi-agency strategy to protect Mali's elephants ███ ████████████████████████████████████ improve livelihoods through "elephant-based" wise resource use initiatives. This has resulted in the production of an updated 5-year national action plan to conserve Mali's elephants and a multi-agency protocole d'accord stipulating the operating conditions of the multi-agency anti-poaching unit (annexe 4).

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been a staunch ally and partner in securing funds together with the Canadian Embassy ████████ for anti-poaching including aerial surveillance), and identifying ways in which they can support project activities, for example in making introductions, and support to human rights training, radio-communications. The deputy head of the mission to Mali is personally engaged.

The Dutch and British Embassy have shown great interest, with the latter identifying useful contacts potential avenues of support, met with key government personnel, attended significant meetings to demonstrate international interest, and will be hosting a meeting of international partners in Mali. The US Embassy has donated equipment.

Due to the increased co-ordination required between the project and various government departments, the project engaged a Bamako-based adviser who is responsible for project-government relations.

3. Project Achievements

3.1 Outputs

Output 1: Anti-poaching rangers are able ███████████████████████████████████ to mount anti-poaching patrols, respond to poaching incidences, collect and report required evidence.

36 anti-poaching rangers have been deployed to mount anti-poaching patrols, respond to poaching incidences, and collect and report required evidence (see indicators 1.2 and 1.6 below). All indicators have been achieved where circumstances have allowed.

This was not straightforward. At the beginning of 2015 a coincidence of factors made this task extremely difficult. When the proposal was written in 2014 the project had the support of a strong and competent Director of DNEF and security appeared to be improving (see graph showing the evolution of insecurity over time in annexe 5). This situation changed when the Director was replaced in January 2015 ████████████████████████████████████ ███ ████████████ At the same time security began to decrease as extremist groups opposed to the peace process mounted attacks and external trafficking networks began calling to individuals in the elephant range for help to poach elephants. ██████████████████████████████. The new Director did nothing to arrange the military training of the 50 rangers that had been recruited by the previous Director, and the project had to push this through by writing the letters and getting the Director to sign. It was very time-consuming. Nothing was done to provide them with arms, firing training or send them to the elephant range. Again the project had to step in. In the meantime poaching escalated out of control. The project engaged MINUSMA and local military commander to send patrols to the scene of poaching incidents and to patrol when word that poachers were in the area came to the project's knowledge (see photos in annexe 6). This slowed the poaching rate ██ ██████

The project arranged for a training course and field visit to Nazinga, Burkina Faso, and Niokolokoba in Senegal (see report in annexe 7), followed by anti-poaching training to be delivered by Chengeta Wildlife (CW). CW were selected because of the value they place on ███████████████████████████████ and intelligence-led tactics and operational procedures that include the key skills of combat tracking, CSI, pursuit, interdiction etc. adapted to the needs of

anti-poaching. In April 2016 Chengeta Wildlife completed a needs assessment of ranger competence and the anti-poaching strategy as a whole.

A core unit of 15 of the most capable DNEF rangers was selected for advanced anti-poaching training (indicator 1.3) led by Rory Young and other specialist trainers in July – September. They also received 2 days of human rights training, provided by the UN, ██████████████ ███████████████████████████████████████ However by the end only 6 were deemed of sufficient quality (see report in annexe 8), ████████████████████████ ██ ████████████████████████████

Sweeping changes in personnel from the Minister to the Chef de Cantonnement, together with the engagement of the Head of the Malian Armed Forces (who knew the project from his time in the North and had always admired it) enabled the APU to be reformed with the 6 DNEF rangers supplemented by 30 of Mali's best soldiers, as the military pledged 3 sets of 30 men rotated every 6 months, until the security situation improves enough for foresters to replace them.

The unit performed to high standards during 10 weeks of advanced in-operations training between November 2016 and March 2017 (see photos in annexe 9), and became fully operational in February 2017. No elephants were recorded as having been poached between February 2017 and the end of the project period, which meant there were no opportunities to conduct reactive missions (indicator 1.4). The unit has, however, repeatedly avoided IED attacks and survived a severe ambush and attack from an estimated 30+ well-trained jihadists in the south-east of the elephant range near the Burkina border, with only 2 wounded (see report in annexe 10).

The foresters who did not pass the final selection have been deployed in forester posts to enable their knowledge to be able to support the team

In January 2018, the unit requested a doubling of their danger money which was refused by the government and the personnel were rotated out the second set of 30 military elements engaged. The old unit will be rotated back in the future to conform with military organisation.

██ ██ ██ ██ ██ ███ ██ ██ ███ ███ ███████████████████████████████████

The rangers currently operate from military bases although the planned posts have been built, ready for use once security returns. The vehicles and the radio-communications system are central to the unit being able to operate. The Land Cruisers are much more manoeuvrable and quieter compared to the VLRA military vehicles, and a valuable complement to the motorbikes, greatly increasing the anti-poaching unit's capacity (see photos in annexe)

Installation of the encrypted radio-communications system was delayed primarily due to administrative issues within the DNEF ██████████████████████████ By the time these were resolved the supplier had to re-order. The security situation deteriorated during this time and Kinetic 6, the suppliers, were unable to safely visit the project area. Instead their experts travelled to Mali to train Malian military personnel on installation and operating procedures (see report in annexe 12), however a key piece of equipment (that establishes the micro-wave connection between repeaters at the masts) had been sent to Malawi instead of Mali and so this part of the training could not take place. Despite this the system was installed in 2016 (see photos in annexe 13) and worked briefly but a sudden loss of power coupled with a deteriorating security situation and difficulty of access to the repeater sites meant that they were impossible to repair. The whole of the system apart from the two repeaters is in continual use and is essential for the unit's daily operation. It has been supplemented with satellite

phones to compensate. The existence of the communication system was key in engaging MINUSMA and the military as a very tangible benefit for them.

To help contain the poaching while the rangers were being trained, the project had to find other ways to contain the escalation in threat, forging multiple new partnerships, ███████████████ ██ ██████████████████████████████Activities included:

(a) writing a series of alerts which it discussed with the Minister to demonstrate that if nothing was done, the elephants could be gone in two years if the rates of poaching witnessed in 2015 continued (see two examples in annexes 3 and 14).

(b) liaising with the Parliamentary working group for wildlife to raise the issues in Parliament and directly to the Prime Minister

(c) ██
███
███
███
███
██
██
██
██████████████████████

███
██████████████████████████████████████

███
███
██
██
███
███
███
███
██
██████████████████████████████████████

(d) working with allies within DNEF

(e) speaking to Reuters about the problem (http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-mali-elephants-idUKKCN0V62UW) which prompted several online petitions addressed to the Minister, the Prime Minister and the President eg http://www.ifaw.org/international/news/petition-save-mali%E2%80%99s-300-remaining-elephants-has-topped

(f) recruiting a special adviser with responsibility for the interface with government, advising the Minister on elephant issues and ensuring that the elephant dossier is pursued within DNEF, particularly with responsibility for anti-poaching. ████████████████████████████
███
███
████████████████████████████████

Some of these partnerships have enabled securing new funds, as listed later.

All rangers and trainees were male apart from 2 women from DNEF who participated in the radio-communications training. The project has no control over the personnel allocated to it by the government.

Indicator 1.1. Number of manned forester posts in the elephant range (baseline = 4; end point = 14). *5 new fixed forester posts constructed and 5 mobile posts established in 2015 although they are not operational until the security situation improves, and the anti-poaching unit is operating out of military bases.*

Indicator 1.2. Number of anti-poaching rangers deployed throughout the elephant range (baseline = 4; endpoint = 30). *36 rangers operational in anti-poaching unit: 6 from DNEF and 30 from the Malian army. 4 foresters deployed in forester posts. (see above)*

Indicator 1.3. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = zero). 18.5 weeks of basic military training in 2015-16; 17 weeks of training from Chengeta Wildlife in 2016-17, including 10 weeks of advanced in-operations training from November 2016-March 2017; and 8 weeks of in-operations mentoring in 2017-18. This makes a total of 43.5 weeks.

Indicator 1.4. Number of incidences of poaching detected (baseline = 12 in six months) and proportion that result in arrests by the anti-poaching unit (baseline = 0 as no APU existed).

NB The baselines for indicator 1.4 were determined in 2014 before the sudden escalation of poaching and decrease in security in 2015 (see graph in annexe). 44 elephants were killed April 2016 – Mar 2017. This represents a 42% decrease compared to the same period in 2015-16 (76 elephants per year). Since the APU became fully operational in February no elephants have been poached (see graph in annexe 17).

Indicator 1.5. An encrypted radio-communications system is installed to enable the anti-poaching unit to communicate across the elephant range, including in areas without mobile phone coverage.

Indicator 1.6. The anti-poaching unit is able to complete reactive and proactive anti-poaching missions throughout the elephant range by end of project. The anti-poaching unit once operational was able to conduct patrols throughout the elephant range although the absence of poaching incidents meant that they did not have the opportunity to conduct reactive missions (also see above)

Output 2: Effective anti-poaching ranger presence throughout the elephant range working in concert with homologues in Burkina Faso.

A series of cross-border meetings and training sessions were held to establish cross-border co-ordination between government agencies

[REDACTED]

The Mali-Burkina region has continued to become increasingly dangerous as the jihadist insurgency spreads and focuses on promoting ethnic conflict. [REDACTED] To date no elephants have been poached while there has been a Malian anti-poaching capacity, meaning that there has been no opportunity to test the level of co-ordination between the Malian and Burkinabe anti-poaching rangers

[REDACTED]

Indicator 2.2. Number of incidences of coordinated action (baseline=zero). *No opportunities for co-ordinated action between the anti-poaching units of the two countries*

3.2 Outcome

Mali has an improved capacity to co-ordinate activities in tracking and tracing elephant poaching, bringing poachers to justice and enforcing poaching laws. This will halt the current escalation of poaching by severely impeding the operation of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking networks in Mali, and thereby maintain elephant numbers.

Mali does have an improved capacity to co-ordinate anti-poaching activities. Basic infrastructure is in place (a dedicated unit able to operate in areas of insecurity, vehicles, motorbikes, communications, bases (indicator 3), cross-border relationship and co-operation (indicator 4) and funds for running costs). A governmental anti-poaching capacity was non-existent before this project. The IWT funding enabled the project to leverage additional funding from MINUSMA and other donors (see list below). These additional funds were crucial because the worsening security situation requires danger money to be paid to the rangers.

This capacity has also attracted a 6-year GEF grant and a 5-year EU grant.

The project activities described in the previous section do seem to have slowed the escalation in poaching and then halted it in 2017-18 with the full operation of the anti-poaching unit. The unit appears to have a deterrent effect (indicator 1). [REDACTED]

The fact that there has been no poaching since this capacity was in place means that there has been no opportunity for arrest and prosecution (indicator 2), although this must be the next goal of the project [REDACTED]

The project continually monitors the security situation to enable it to adapt its activities accordingly. Monthly reports are produced and the ACLED and Long War Journals regularly consulted (indicator 5 see annexe 5).

Indicators:

1. Number of elephant illegally killed and rate of increase/decrease in killings compared to existing rate, aiming for no further increase within the project period (2014 baseline = 12 in six months).

2. Number and proportion of illegal killings for which the perpetrators are arrested by the anti-poaching unit, and subsequently prosecuted (baseline = 0 arrests & 0 prosecutions (no APU existed); target by project end = ≥0 arrest of confirmed poacher resulting in ≥0 prosecution).

3. Extension of forester field presence – the creation and equipment of 10 additional forester posts throughout the elephant range

4. Development of a cross-border capacity for co-operation in anti-poaching operations.

5. Ongoing monitoring of security incidents to detect trends across the elephant range throughout project period (baseline Apr 2014-Mar 2015 = 2 security incidents)

3.3   Impact: achievement of positive impact on illegal wildlife trade and poverty alleviation

Impact: A reduction in elephant poaching, an increase in security, and poverty alleviation in the Gourma region of Mali.

There has been a reduction in elephant poaching, and then it was halted in 2017. This can only be attributed to the actions of the Mali Elephant Project as there is no other conceivable factor, particularly as the security situation has continued to deteriorate throughout. This was the only enforcement unit able to operate in the elephant range. However there are still poachers at large and it could restart at any moment. Although the identities of the poachers are known it is difficult to apprehend them with the proof required for a successful prosecution unless the incident has just happened, and the unit has not yet had that opportunity. However by passing information to bodies specialising in anti-trafficking this information it can be put together with information from other sources as it appears that the traffickers of ivory are the same as those who engage in the trafficking of other illegal commodities.

4.   Monitoring of assumptions

Outcome level assumptions:

Assumption 1. Increased enforcement capacity leads to reduced poaching incidences.
Comments: This does seem to be the case, given that there has been no poaching since the APU became fully operational.

Assumption 2. Mali remains committed to supporting the enforcement of its laws on poaching.
Comments: The 5-year action plan and the protocol d'accord suggest that Mali is committed to this, as does the Presidential directive, and the actions of the Parliamentary working group on

Wildlife Crime raising the elephants for debate in Parliament, however the government is highly dysfunctional and providing the required capacity requires continued engagement.

Assumption 3. Trafficking networks can be deterred from targeting ivory. Comments: Identities of at least some of the poachers have been discovered and they are indeed part of trafficking networks. The reduction in poaching since February 2017 suggests deterrence, although poaching may return if the unit is prevented from operating.

Output level assumptions:

Assumption 1. That civil war does not reoccur and government remains in the elephant range. Comments: This is the key assumption that rules all others (it should really be an outcome level assumption as it affects everything). It was and is an unknown as it depends on the actions of other actors, but was closely monitored throughout the project. In 2014 when the situation was improving, project activities had a noticeable impact on improving security. The graph in annexe shows the improvement but then the subsequent deterioration (accompanied by decreased government presence) which has been particularly dramatic over the last year.

Assumption 2. That all levels of the DNEF remain committed to elephant protection. Comments: This is a key assumption. All levels are not committed to elephant protection but enough key individuals of sufficient seniority have been mobilised to oblige the others to follow suit.

Assumption 3. Greater capacity to respond prevents an increase in poaching incidents. Comments: This does seem to be valid. The poaching rate has been reduced to zero since the deployment of the APU.

Assumption 4. That DNEF contains staff turnover to ensure a corpus of personnel develop an elephant protection ethic that is strong enough to be transmitted to subsequent officers. Comments: So far he DNEF have been co-operative on this front. The new anti-poaching plan makes provision for military turnover as requested by the military, and the protocole together with the multi-agency anti-poaching committee makes provision for inter-agency discussion on optimal staff deployment.

5. Project support to the IWT Challenge Fund Objectives and commitments under the London Declaration and Kasane Statement

The project contributes to:

1. Developing sustainable livelihoods for communities affected by illegal wildlife trade, as described in sections 7, and 8.

2. Strengthening law enforcement and the role of the criminal justice system through the creation of a government anti-poaching system from scratch, beginning with an anti-poaching ranger force in the elephant range, and working with bilateral partners to involve the other relevant government enforcement agencies.

The project contributes to the following commitments under the London Declaration:

XIII. Invest in capacity building to strengthen law enforcement to protect key populations of species threatened by poaching

XIV. Establish and maintain national cross-agency mechanisms

XVII. Recognise the negative impact of illegal wildlife trade on sustainable livelihoods and economic development – ███████████████████████

XVIII. Increase capacity of local communities to pursue sustainable livelihood opportunities and eradicate poverty

██
██
████████████████████████
███
████████████████████████████████ .

The project contributes to the following commitments under the Kasane statement:

C. STRENGTHENING LAW ENFORCEMENT

Support the strengthening and, if necessary, the establishment of regional wildlife enforcement networks

D. SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (see section 7 below)

Promote the retention of benefits from wildlife resources by local people where they have traditional and/or legal rights over these resources.

Support work done in countries to address the challenges that people, in particular rural populations, can face in living and coexisting with wildlife, through the wider project.

Establish, facilitate and support information-sharing mechanisms

Support work by countries and intergovernmental organisations, as well as nongovernmental organisations, that seeks to identify the situations where, and the mechanisms by which, actions at the local level, ███████████████████████ can reduce the illegal wildlife trade

6.   Impact on species in focus

The project has prevented the complete decimation of this elephant population by braking the sudden escalation in poaching witnessed in 2015 that resulted from a decrease in security, a new targeting of the local population by international trafficking networks, and the change in leadership at DNEF. This has been through the efforts to engage multiple partners and work simultaneously at local, national and international levels.

The poaching rate decreased by 42% in the second year compared to the previous year and since the APU became fully operational in February2017 no elephants were poached (see graph/maps in annexe 17).

7.   Project support to poverty alleviation

██
██
███
███
███
██
██████████████████████████████████████
██
███████████████████

██
███
███████████████████████████████████
███
██
██
██
███████████████████████████████████████
███
███
███
███
███
███
███
██████████████████████████████

Initially there was the possibility to improve physical security however the insurgency is currently, at the time of writing, too extreme. The anti-poaching unit has, however, provided a

model for how to operate in this highly insecure zone, that has drawn the attention of the Malian and international militaries (see above).

8.   Consideration of gender equality issues

It was difficult for this IWT project to have an impact on gender equality as it has to work with the personnel provided by the government. The project, however, impacts gender equity issues indirectly through supporting the security required for local livelihoods; ███████████████

███
███
███
███
███
███████████████████████████████████████
███████████████████

9.   Lessons learnt

The project was constantly learning given the highly changeable and unpredictable situation which required continual creative adaptation; and the need to operate as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. Learning was built into the methodology and approach whereby activities were trialled on a small scale and modified before launching on a larger scale. The development of the APU is a good example of adapting to the socio-political context. ████████
███
███
██████████████████████████

Key to success are competent field operatives using a doctrine that combines █████████
██████████████████ with intelligence-driven arrest and deterrence operations.

Things that have worked well include: developing partnerships with MINUSMA, the Malian army and the Parliamentary working group; ████████████████████; finding appropriate partners to provide ranger training and an aerial surveillance package.

Things that did not work well include the glacial progress in the deployment of the APU and the initial training due to the absence of/obstructive leadership within DNEF. However this experience provided the concrete evidence required for sweeping personnel change and a complete-turnaround to rapidly produce an operational APU that the trainer says is the most competent anti-poaching unit he has trained in the 12 African countries in which he has worked.

Although success may be achieved it requires continual monitoring and effort to ensure that the conditions required are maintained and elements of the context required for this to be sustainable continue to be put in place. In Mali this is mostly about capacity building and the GEF and EU projects are designed with this as a key aim.

It is difficult to see what could have been done differently given the knowledge at the time, the constraints and the ever-changing, unpredictable nature of the situation.

9.1   Monitoring and evaluation

There was a change to the log-frame that involved the removal of output 2: ████████████
███
████████████████████████████████████

The removal of support at the top levels of DNEF meant that the project's ambitions had to be reduced because engagement with the government became very lengthy and time-consuming. At the same time the security situation (which had been improving) decreased drastically, again significantly reducing what was possible, and causing most of the commune, cercle and regional personnel to flee, and we had to abandon this output. All focus had to be on trying to get the anti-poaching unit operational.

The sudden difficulty in operation meant we had to make alliances with other actors, modify our strategies, and take advantage of potential collaborations eg working with the PARCC programme in cross-border operations enabled money to be saved that could be spent on training visits for the anti-poaching unit.

We also had to respond to emergencies and opportunities as for example in October 2015 when poaching resurged ██ ████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████

Evaluation was difficult due to the danger of access but MINUSMA visited 4 times (e.g. see photos in annexe 6) and given favourable reviews that have led to increased funding and a short film on the anti-poaching training.

The M&E system provided helpful feedback on the impact of actions on the elephant poaching. The project reports had to include actions not funded by their grant to be able to make sense of this grant's contributions.

9.2   Actions taken in response to annual report reviews

The reviews were discussed with partners and the comments acted on, ████████████████ ████████████████

■ ██ ██ ██ ████████████████████████████████████

10.   Other comments on achievements not covered elsewhere

The achievements have been mostly covered elsewhere but the one overall achievement is that the project has kept going and made some difference. It is hard to adequately express how incredibly difficult this process has been; quite how everything has been changing …. continually; quite what an impact the change in leadership coupled with the security situation in the elephant range has had on operations and the time and resources required; and the challenge required in keeping anything happening at all. As a result the administrative process has not been conducted in as elegant a way as would be hoped.

11.   Sustainability and legacy

The project enjoys high profile in Mali, within the government, MINUSMA *("everybody is talking about it in the mission")*, and certain embassies. Because the project works closely with government the Minister is well briefed and the project provides a high level of technical support to the MEADD and DNEF in planning and management. The project writes continual briefings for government, which have on one occasion resulted in a Presidential to government in February which resulted in the President issuing a directive to the government to ensure elephant protection.

The achievements, particularly in creating a five-year plan for the elephants, a tri-partite protocole d'accord signed by the Head of the Armed Forces and the Director of DNEF for the mobilisation of the unit, a Presidential decree and the actions of the Parliamentary working group demonstrate commitment within the Mali Government.

This has led to Mali becoming a member of the Elephant Protection Initiative and has provided the foundation to attract GEF and EU investment. The GEF grant includes support to legislative and judicial aspects of IWT.

The planned exit strategy is still the same. The project has attracted GEF funding for 6 years and EU funding for 5 years with the possibility of additional grants if all goes well. The aim is for the anti-poaching unit to ultimately come under the umbrella of the government

## 12.	IWT Challenge Fund Identity

The project acknowledges the contribution of the IWT Challenge fund and uses the well-recognised UK Government Aid logo on all presentations and papers, and in all engagements with the Malian government and international agencies in particular. This is supported by the engagement of the British Embassy which makes the UK well-recognised as a key player. All articles recognise the role of project partners with a hyperlink to a page where the UK aid logo is amongst the most prominent. It is listed as a major donor/partner. It requests this acknowledgement in all media pieces although this is not always respected. The logo was going to be painted on the doors of the anti-poaching vehicles although this was not thought to be a good idea as it would likely invite jihadist attack.

## 13.	OPTIONAL: Outstanding achievements of your project during the (300-400 words maximum). This section may be used for publicity purposes

I agree for the IWT Secretariat to publish the content of this section (please leave this line in to indicate your agreement to use any material you provide here)

Outstanding achievements:

- The sudden break-though and rapid transition from a seemingly hopeless situation in September 2016 when the training had ground to a halt with only 6 out of 50 rangers of sufficient capacity and motivation; to a high-performing, operational unit ("this is the best unit I have ever trained in Africa" Rory Young of Chengeta Wildlife) that has everyone in the UN mission talking about their ability to operate in an area thought to be too dangerous for any but special forces. This is discussed in more detail in the following brief article published on the National Geographic "A Voice for Elephants" blog

    http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2017/04/07/ground-breaking-initial-success-in-protecting-malis-elephants-but-it-must-be-sustained/

- Being able to do this despite multiple obstacles, not least of which is the continual decrease in security and intensification in jihadist infiltration, an absence of leadership or engagement at national and local levels of DNEF, the coincidence of funding delays of several months by multiple funders in 2016, and the ever increasing pressure on the region's water and land resources from ever-expanding herds of livestock.

- The project has managed to find creative and innovative actions to cope with these despite relatively tiny budgets.

- ███
██
███████████████████████████

14. Finance and administration

14.1 Project expenditure

Project spend (indicative) since last annual report	2017/18 Grant (£)	2017/18 Total actual IWT Costs (£)	Variance %	Comments (please explain significant variances)
Staff costs (see below)	██	██	0	
Consultancy costs				
Overhead Costs	██	██	0	
Travel and subsistence				
Operating Costs	██	██	0	
Capital items (see below)				
Others (see below)				
TOTAL	██	██		

Staff employed (Name and position)	Cost (£)
Louis Phipps, Project assistant	██
Alassane Maiga, Anti-poaching officer	██
TOTAL	██

Capital items – description *Please detail what items were purchased with fund money, and where these will remain once the project finishes*	Capital items – cost (£)
TOTAL	0

Other items – description *Please provide a detailed breakdown for any single item over £1000*	Other items – cost (£)
TOTAL	

14.2 Additional funds or in-kind contributions secured

Source of funding for project lifetime	Total (£)
HGBF-ANPN-Gabon	██
IUCN-CMS	██
ICFC	██
MINUSMA	██
Elephant Crisis Fund	██
CITES-MIKE	██
USFWS-IWT	██
African Elephant Fund	██
MINUSMA Human Rights training for APU	██
MINUSMA plus US and UK Embassy support at key government meetings, and for anti-trafficking analysis	██

	Total (£)
Chengeta Wildlife trainer fees for first year	███
Malian military - salaries and use of armoured vehicles (MEP pays danger money, fuel, small repairs, medical supplies)	███
DNEF members of the APU - salaries and arms	███
TOTAL	███

Source of funding for additional work after project lifetime	Total (£)
MINUSMA ($███ for IWT; $███ for community)	███
African Elephant Fund (iwt)	███
GEF-UNDP grant of $███ for IWT (government and community) (of which $███ to MEP for IWT-gov and $███ to MEP for community)	███
EU (EUR ███ to MEP for community plus trainer support to government IWT)	███
IWT Challenge Fund round 4	███
International Conservation Fund of Canada (approx. $███ /year for core-funding, support to the creation of a new protected area covering the entire elephant range and CBNRM, proportion for IWT not yet determined)	███
MINUSMA Human Rights training for APU	███
Malian military - salaries, arms and use of armoured vehicles (MEP pays danger money, fuel, small repairs, medical supplies)	███
DNEF members of the APU - salaries	███
MINUSMA plus US and UK Embassy support at key government meetings, and for anti-trafficking analysis	███
TOTAL	███

14.3 Value for Money

The project is extremely good value for money as it entailed establishing a whole new function for Mali that had never existed in the country before that enables Mali to act against ivory poaching. As a result there was neither local expertise nor capacity.

In addition this took place in a country that is the UN's most dangerous peace-keeping mission (see https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34812600 and https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/war_in_the_desert). This anti-poaching unit was the only government enforcement body operating in the area in 2015-2017 (apart from French anti-terrorist Barkhane forces) until the G5 operations began. It made a significant impact in-country with its doctrine that enabled it to operate despite several attempts to blow it up, and repelled a highly organised ambush.

It is a beginning. It has set the foundations that have already attracted additional partners to invest; and it has collaborated with agencies already establishing support to the judiciary to fight trafficking. The GEF project is set to support the legislative aspects of IWT as well as the functioning of the anti-poaching unit.

Annex 1 Project's original (or most recently approved) logframe, including indicators, means of verification and assumptions.

Note: Insert your full logframe. If your logframe was changed since your application and was approved by a Change Request the newest approved version should be inserted here, otherwise insert application logframe.

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Means of verification	Important Assumptions
Impact: A reduction in elephant poaching, an increase in security, and poverty alleviation in the Gourma region of Mali.			
Outcome: Mali has an improved capacity to co-ordinate activities in tracking and tracing elephant poaching, bringing poachers to justice and enforcing poaching laws. This will halt the current escalation of poaching by severely impeding the operation of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking networks in Mali, and thereby maintain elephant numbers.	1. Number of elephant illegally killed and rate of increase/decrease in killings compared to existing rate, aiming for no further increase within the project period (2014 baseline = 12 in six months). 2. Number and proportion of illegal killings for which the perpetrators are arrested by the anti-poaching unit, and subsequently prosecuted (baseline = 0 arrests & 0 prosecutions (no APU existed); target by project end = ≥0 arrest of confirmed poacher resulting in ≥0 prosecution). 3. Extension of forester field presence – the creation and equipment of 10 additional forester posts throughout the elephant range 4. Development of a cross-border capacity for co-operation in anti-poaching operations. 5. Ongoing monitoring of security incidents to detect trends across the elephant range throughout project period (baseline Apr 2014-Mar 2015 = 2 security incidents)	1. DNEF database containing information about all known poaching incidences, and project reports. 2. DNEF database, and government records of prosecutions containing information about all known poaching incidences, and project reports. 3. Existence of forester posts: photographs; government reports. 4a. DNEF and project reports evaluating response to particular incidents; 4b. Protocole d'accord and the number of joint operations as enumerated in DNEF database and reports of the DNEF and project. 5. Records and maps of armed attacks derived from data published by the Long War Journal and ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project) databases. Additional UN and Crisis Group reports when appropriate.	Assumption 1. Increased enforcement capacity leads to reduced poaching incidences. Assumption 2. Mali remains committed to supporting the enforcement of its laws on poaching. Assumption 3. Trafficking networks can be deterred from targeting ivory. Assumption 4. That the security situation does not deteriorate to a level that the operation of the anti-poaching unit is rendered impossible.
Output 1. Anti-poaching rangers are able to ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ mount anti-poaching patrols, respond to poaching incidences, collect and report	1.1. Number of manned forester posts in the elephant range (baseline = 4; end point = 14). 1.2. Number of anti-poaching rangers deployed throughout the elephant range	1.1. Reports; photos; map. 1.2. Training reports and photos; operations reports.	1. That civil war does not reoccur and government remains in the elephant range. 2. That all levels of the DNEF remain committed to elephant protection.

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Means of verification	Important Assumptions
required evidence.	(baseline = 0; endpoint = 30). 1.3. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = zero). 1.4. Number of poaching incidents detected (2014 baseline = 12 in six months) and proportion that result in arrests by the anti-poaching unit (baseline = 0 (no APU existed)). 1.5. An encrypted radio-communications system is installed to enable the anti-poaching unit to communicate across the elephant range, including in areas without mobile phone coverage. 1.6. The anti-poaching unit is able to complete reactive and proactive anti-poaching missions throughout the elephant range by end of project. ██████████████████ ██████████████████ ████████████ ██████████████████ ████████████████ ██████████████ ████████████████ ████████████ ███████████████ ████	1.3. Training reports and photos. 1.4. Database of poaching records and judicial progress held by DNEF and the project. 1.5. Communications system functioning effectively during APU operations, verified by anti-poaching trainers in post-training/operations reports. 1.6. Local reports and in-operations training reports. ████████████████████	3. Greater capacity to respond prevents an increase poaching incidents. 4. That DNEF contains staff turnover to ensure a corpus of personnel develop an elephant protection ethic that is strong enough to be transmitted to subsequent officers.
Output 2. Effective anti-poaching ranger presence throughout the elephant range working in concert with homologues in Burkina Faso.	2.1. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 provided ████████ ██████████ foresters from the south of the elephant range and Burkina Faso (baseline=zero) 2.2. Number of incidences of coordinated action (baseline=zero).	████████████████ ████████████	████████
Activities (each activity is numbered according to the output that it will contribute towards, for example 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 are contributing to Output 1) 1.1. Construction, equipment and establishment of 10 additional forester posts. 1.2. Deployment of 2 vehicles plus protocols of use and responsibility, under the control of the project's field manager working in conjunction with the chefs de service. 1.3. Installation of a military state-of-the-art secured radio-communications system in the most vulnerable parts of the elephant range.			

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Means of verification	Important Assumptions

1.4. Training course and field visit to Nazinga Game Ranch in Burkina Faso for field foresters in anti-poaching procedures.
1.5. Training of field foresters ███████████████████████████████.
1.6. Subsequent training courses in 2016 and 2017 based on needs assessed through ongoing monitoring of performance.

███

███

███████████████████████████████

Work-plan with key milestones. "X" indicates target quarter of implementation; completed activities (at end of 2016-17) are indicated by "C".

Activity	No of Months	FY 1 Q4	FY 2 – 2015-16 Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	FY 3 – 2016-17 Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	FY 4 – 2017-18 Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Output 1	Anti-poaching rangers able ███████████████████ to respond to poaching incidents and gather required evidence.													
1.1.Forester posts	4	X	XC											
1.2. Vehicles	3	X	XC											
1.3.Radio-comms system	4	X	X		C								C	
1.4.Nazinga training	0.5	X				C								
1.5.Training rangers ████	Ongoing		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
1.6.Subsequent training	1						C	C	C	C	C			
██████ ██████ ████	0.5		X		C									
Output 2	Effective anti-poaching ranger presence throughout the elephant range working in concert with homologues in Burkina Faso.													
2.1 Cross-border meetings, training	0.5	X	C											
2.2.Follow-up meetings	1			C	C	X		C	C	C				

Annex 2 Report of progress and achievements against final project logframe for the life of the project

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Progress and Achievements
Impact A reduction in elephant poaching, an increase in security, and poverty alleviation in the Gourma region of Mali.		There was a 42% decrease in poaching between year 1 and year 2; and no elephants poached in Y3 since the APU became fully operational in February 2017, despite an ever-worsening security situation (see annexe 17). ██████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████ ██████████████████████ ███████████████████████████████ ███████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████ ████████████ ████████████████ Initially there was the possibility to improve physical security however the insurgency is currently, at the time of writing, too extreme (see annexe 5). The anti-poaching unit has, however, provided a model for how to operate in this highly insecure zone, that has drawn the attention of the Malian and international militaries (e.g. annexe 10).
Outcome Mali has an improved capacity to co-ordinate activities in tracking and tracing elephant poaching, bringing poachers to justice and enforcing poaching laws. This will halt the current escalation of poaching by severely impeding the operation of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking networks in Mali, and thereby maintain elephant numbers.	1. Number of elephant illegally killed and rate of increase/decrease in killings compared to existing rate, aiming for no further increase within the project period (2014 baseline = 12 in six months). 2. Number and proportion of illegal killings for which the perpetrators are arrested by the anti-poaching unit, and subsequently prosecuted (baseline = 0 arrests & 0 prosecutions (no APU existed); target by project end = ≥0 arrest of confirmed poacher resulting in ≥0 prosecution). 3. Extension of forester field	The outcome has been achieved with the deployment of a functioning anti-poaching unit trained in CSI, pursuit, interdiction, ███████████████████ operation in an insecure zone etc. Poaching has been slowed and halted, and it appears that this is due to the deployment of the APU. However for this result to continue into the future the APU's deployment must be continued and arrests made. In year 2 there was a 42% reduction in poaching achieved through a variety of tactics: engagement of the highest levels of government, issuing red alerts, briefing papers and action plans; ████████████████████████████ ████████████ arranging military patrols while pushing for ranger deployment (e.g. annexes 2, 3, 14, 15, 16). Once the unit was fully operational in February 2017 it did appear that the escalation in poaching was halted and that this was due to the combination of: - Poachers and traffickers being aware that their identities were known - The ability of the anti-poaching unit to operate despite the insecurity Indicator 1. Total number of elephants killed April 2015 – March 2016 = 76; April

	presence – the creation and equipment of 10 additional forester posts throughout the elephant range 4. Development of a cross-border capacity for co-operation in anti-poaching operations. 5. Ongoing monitoring of security incidents to detect trends across the elephant range throughout project period (baseline Apr 2014-Mar 2015 = 2 security incidents)	2016 – March 2017 = 44); and April 2017 – March 2018 = 0 (annexe 17) Indicator 2. No arrests directly linked to poaching incidents were made by the anti-poaching unit as poaching appeared to stop as soon as they became fully operational in February 2017. Indicator 3. The 10 additional ranger posts have been constructed and are awaiting the deployment of the foresters once the security situation allows. Currently the APU operates from military bases and sleeps in irregular mobile camps to avoid detection and ambush Indicator 4. Cross-border relationships have been established between government services ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ In recent months this area has seen intense jihadust activity, and a retreat of government, ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮. The ability for the APU to work with the Burkinabe equivalent has not been tested because there have been no poaching incidents while they have been operational. See also output 2 below. Indicator 5. The security situation in central Mali has continued to deteriorate throughout the project period (annexe 5). The ACLED database indicates the following numbers of attacks/fatalities in the elephant range: 2014=1/1; 2015=7/27; 2016 = 33/80; 2017 = 76/105 (see map in annexe). Also reports: UN report, Crisis Group report <u>Comments on indicators</u>: the indicators seem reasonable, although "developing capacity" in indicator 4 is difficult to measure with objective indicators without the opportunity for it to be tested.
Output 1. Anti-poaching rangers are able to work ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ to mount anti-poaching patrols, respond to poaching incidences, collect and report required evidence.	1.1. Number of manned forester posts in the elephant range (baseline = 4; end point = 14). 1.2. Number of anti-poaching rangers deployed throughout the elephant range (baseline = 0; endpoint = 30). 1.3. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = zero). 1.4. Number of poaching incidents detected (2014 baseline = 12 in six months) and proportion that result in arrests by the anti-poaching unit (baseline = 0 (no APU existed)).	The anti-poaching rangers are able to mount patrols, and have been trained to respond to poaching incidences, collect and report required evidence although these latter abilities have yet to be tested as there have been no poaching incidences since they have become fully operational. Indicator 1.1. 5 new fixed ranger posts constructed and 5 mobile posts established (though not operational until the security situation improves). Funds secured from MINUSMA for reinforcement of fixed posts. Total posts = 14. Indicator 1.2. A 36-man mixed-agency anti-poaching unit became fully operational in February 2017, and regularly conducted patrols throughout the elephant range. The 30 military elements will rotate every 6 months – a year unitl a total of 90 are trained, while the foresters will remain. The aim is for foresters to replace the military once the security improves. Total rangers = 36. Indicator 1.3. 50 rangers received 18.5 weeks government military training in 2015. The 15 best rangers received 7 weeks training in 2016, as the aim was to train them to train the others. At the end of this period only 6 were deemed of sufficient standard to continue. These were supplemented by 30 military elements to create a

	1.5. An encrypted radio-communications system is installed to enable the anti-poaching unit to communicate across the elephant range, including in areas without mobile phone coverage. 1.6. The anti-poaching unit is able to complete reactive and proactive anti-poaching missions throughout the elephant range by end of project. ████████████████ ██████████████████ ██████████████ ████████████████ ████████████████ █████████████████ ███████████████ ██████████████ ██████████████ ███████	mixed unit of 36 anti-poaching rangers. After 10 weeks of training this unit became fully operational and received a further 8 weeks of in-operations training/mentoring in 2017-18. Total weeks of training = 43.5 (annexes 8,9,10) Indicator 1.4. 73 elephants were killed from the beginning of the project (February) to the end of 2015 and 16 in the first three months of 2016 (all in the first two weeks of January). No arrests were made by the anti-poaching unit as poaching appeared to stop as soon as they became fully operational in February 2017. Number of poaching incidents detected = 76 in Y1, 44 in Y2 and 0 in Y3; Number resulting in arrests = 0 (annexe 17) Indicator 1.5 –Completed, see activity 1.3 below (annexes 12, 13) Indicator 1.6 – The APU has demonstrated its ability to conduct proactive missions but has as yet to have the opportunity to conduct reactive missions. Indicator 1.7 – Completed, see activity 1.7 below (annexes 14, 15, 16) Comments on indicators: Some of the indicators under this output reflect level of activity rather than impact, however indicator 1.4 measures impact as suggested by the decrease in elephant poaching despite ever-worsening security, however it needs to be reported by year (as indicator 1.3) to show this rather than as an average. Plus circumstances outside the project's control caused this number to initially increase. Number of weeks of training is a reasonable measure of input. An additional indicator could have been number of days patrolling (which averaged 12 per month since February 2017). The provision of the vital tools – vehicles and radio-communications – is a measure of progress given that these are part of the enabling context. While impact is the focus, activity level is also an important indicator for this project as it is keen to know the level of activity required to deliver impact. Indicator 1.7 measures activity. The national impact of activity 1.7 would have been impossible to predict by an indicator in advance. Its impact on poaching (a higher level indicator) was part of a suite of measures to try to halt poaching while the anti-poaching unit was being trained and deployed, as reflected y the decrease in poaching rate during this time.
Activity 1.1 *Construction, equipment and establishment of 10 additional forester posts.* **Not funded by IWTC funds.**		The new forester posts – 5 fixed and 5 mobile - were completed on schedule by the end of June 2015, and will be used once the security situation improves. In the meantime the APU operates from military bases and uses irregular mobile camps while on patrol to avoid detection and ambush.
Activity 1.2. *Deployment of 2 vehicles plus protocols of use and responsibility, under the control of the project's field manager working in*		Two vehicles were procured and in place by the end of June 2015, as scheduled. They are central to the training and operation of the APU.

conjunction with the chefs de service.	
Activity 1.3. *Installation of a military state-of-the-art secured radio-communications system in the most vulnerable parts of the elephant range.*	The radio-communications system is installed and operational apart from the two repeaters. As the security situation has decreased these have not been replaced due to the difficulty of protecting them from sabotage and their function has been replaced by satellite phones. (annexes 12 and 13)
Activity 1.4. *Training course and field visit to Nazinga Game Ranch in Burkina Faso for field foresters in anti-poaching procedures.* **Not funded by IWTC funds**	Completed in March 2016. 25 of the 50 foresters travelled to Nazinga Game Ranch, Burkina Faso, and 25 travelled to Niokolo-Koba National Park in Senegal. These one-week training visits provided the foresters with insights into practical challenges and anti-poaching strategies from rangers who were of similar ethnicities, operating in similar administrations, ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████ This was particularly valuable for the rangers who were illiterate, or didn't speak French (and yet were some of the best rangers) and so couldn't read the anti-poaching manual (annexe 7)
Activity 1.5. *Training of field foresters* ██████████████ ████████████████████ *and ongoing monitoring of performance.* **Not funded by IWTC funds**	A training manual was produced in 2015; they received 2-days human rights training rom MINUSMA, ████████████████████████████████████ ███████████
Activity 1.6. *Subsequent training courses in 2016 and 2017 based on needs assessed through ongoing monitoring of performance.* **Partially funded by IWTC funds**	Refer to output indicator 1.3 above 50 rangers received 18.5 weeks government military training in 2015. The 15 best rangers received 7 weeks training in 2016, as the aim was to train them to train the others. At the end of this period only 6 were deemed of sufficient standard to continue. These were supplemented by 30 military elements to create a mixed unit of 36 anti-poaching rangers. After 10 weeks of training this unit became fully operational and received a further 8 weeks of in-operations training/mentoring in 2017-18. The makes a total of 43.5 weeks of training, in-operations training/mentoring over the course of the project. (see annexes 8,9 and 10)
████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████	████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████

Output 2. Effective anti-poaching ranger presence throughout the elephant range working in concert with homologues in Burkina Faso.	2.1. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 provided to ██████████████ foresters from the south of the elephant range and Burkina Faso (baseline=zero) 2.2. Number of incidences of coordinated action (baseline=zero).	The APU is able to work throughout the elephant range (see output 1). The principles for co-ordination between foresters in Mali and Burkina Faso have been established and there is communication between agencies on both sides of the border. Indicator 2.1. 456 person days (65 person weeks) of training was provided in 2015 for Malian and Burkinabe foresters ████████████████████████████████ ██ ███████████████████████████. Indicator 2.2. 8 co-ordinated military patrols were conducted between existing foresters and the Malian military in 2015 however since then the border area has become a focus of jihadist activity and government is absent (annexe 6) Comments on indicators: The indicators under this output reflect level of activity rather than impact. Impact was suggested by the decrease in elephant poaching at this time (a higher order indicator) ████████████████████████ ██████████████████████████████████Activity level is also an important indicator for this project as it is keen to know the level of activity required to deliver impact including the amount of effort required in each area to deliver the desired results given confounding factors such as degree of social cohesion and insecurity/insurgency.
██████ ████████████████████████████████████ ██ ████████████████████████████		██ ██ ██ ██ ████████████████████████████████ ██ ██ ████████████████████████████████ ██ ██████████████████████████████████████ ████████████
██████ ████████████████████████████████ █████████████		██ ██████████████████████████████████████ ██ ██ ██████████████████████████████████████ ██████████████ ████████████████████████ ████████████████

Annex 3 IWT Contacts

Ref No	IWT 018
Project Title	Developing long-term law enforcement capcity to protect the Mali elephants
Project Leader Details	
Name	Dr Susan Canney
Role within IWT Project	Director
███████	████████████████████████
█████	████████
████████	████████
█████	██████████████
Partner 1	
Name	Soumana Timbo
Organisation	Direction Nationale des Eaux et Forets
Role within IWT Project	Government partner
███████	██████████████████████████
████████	
█████	███████████
Partner 2 etc.	
Name	Emma Davis
Organisation	British Embassy
Role within IWT Project	Liaison at British Embassy
███████	███████████████
████████	
█████	████████████

Checklist for submission

	Check
Is the report less than 10MB? If so, please email to IWT-Fund@ltsi.co.uk putting the project number in the subject line.	N/A
Is your report more than 10MB? If so, please discuss with IWT-Fund@ltsi.co.uk about the best way to deliver the report, putting the project number in the subject line.	X
Have you included means of verification? You need not submit every project document, but the main outputs and a selection of the others would strengthen the report.	X
Do you have hard copies of material you want to submit with the report? If so, please make this clear in the covering email and ensure all material is marked with the project number.	N/A
Have you involved your partners in preparation of the report and named the main contributors	X
Have you completed the Project Expenditure table fully?	X
Do not include claim forms or other communications with this report.	